



Program of the Workshop on

"Designing Matching Markets"**August 28–29, 2014****Thursday, August 28, 2014**

11.00 – 12.30	Registration and lunch buffet
12.30 – 14.00	Session 1: New matching models <i>Utku M. Ünver</i> (Boston College) Living donor organ exchange: Beyond kidneys <i>Isa Hafalir</i> (Carnegie Mellon) College admissions with entrance exams: Centralized versus decentralized
14.00 – 14.30	Coffee Break
14.30 – 16.00	Session 2: Large matching markets <i>Fuhito Kojima</i> (Stanford) Stable matching in large economies <i>Olivier Tercieux</i> (Paris School of Economics) Efficiency and stability in large matching markets
16.00 – 16.30	Coffee Break
16.30 – 18.00	Session 3: Experiments & student exchange programs <i>Alistair Wilson</i> (Pittsburgh) Clearinghouses for two-sided matching: An experimental study <i>Umut Dur</i> (North Carolina State) Flexible top trading cycles and chains mechanism: Maintaining diversity in an Erasmus exchange
19.00	Conference Dinner



Friday, August 29, 2014

- 9.30 – 11.00 **Session 4: Dynamic matching**
Francis Bloch (Paris School of Economics)
Dynamic allocation of objects to queuing agents

Hidekazu Anno (Waseda)
Second-best incentive compatible allocation rules
for multiple-type indivisible objects
- 11.00 – 11.30 Coffee Break
- 11.30 – 13.00 **Session 5: Matching with monetary transfers**

Naoki Watanabe (Tsukuba)
Von-Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a one-to-many
assignment problem with externalities

Zaifu Yang (York)
An efficient dynamic multi-item auction with budget constrained
bidders
- 13.00 – 14.00 Lunch
- 14.00 – 15.30 **Session 6: School choice**

Caterina Calsamiglia (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
School choice in a Tiebout model

Federico Echenique (Caltech)
How to control controlled school choice
- 15.30 – 16.00 Coffee Break
- 16.00 – 16.45 **Session 7: Random matching**

Hervé Moulin (Glasgow)
Size versus fairness in the assignment problem
- 19.00 Farewell Dinner (informal)